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This note proposes an econometric framework for studying electoral returns using aggregate
voting and socioeconomic panel data. Along with usual covariates, the model includes
electoral unit effects, electoral subunit effects and time effects, and features nested groupings
and heteroskedasticity. We apply the framework to model the electoral behavior of US
counties in congressional elections.
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1. Introduction 
  The US electoral data provide rich opportunities for studying the individual as well as 
aggregate behavior. The data usually span quite long periods of time; legislative branch elections 
occur bi-yearly and presidential elections – every four years. This means that the time dimension 
of electoral panels may be quite large. At the same time the cross-sectional dimension may be 
huge if one wishes to consider the behavior of very small electoral units like wards, townships 
and precincts. The negative fact is that for such small units there exists no statistics on socioeco-
nomic indicators that are likely to appear as regressors in a reasonable econometric model. More 
precisely, “many of the sources of data for subcounty units are little known outside their local 
areas... The costs of collecting data, as a consequence, rise dramatically when research is fo-
cused upon such subcounty units and when reliance must be placed upon scattered and idiosyn-
cratic data sources” (Austin, Clubb and Traugott 1981). But studying the behavior of larger elec-
toral units, counties say, relaxes these problems since there are many sources of socioeconomic 
data for them. These data are though often incomplete and contaminated. 
  Another dimension of analysis is possible due to the fact that elections into different of-
fices usually occur simultaneously. This means that returns of presidential, federal and state leg-
islative elections may be studied together. Also, usually there are more that two parties standing 
for election, which permits broader analysis than that of returns for one of the parties. Finally, 
one may take into account a voter turnout (which seems to be the primary concern in political 
studies) having in mind the selection problem – difference in willingness to vote among, say, 
democrat and republican sympathizers. It is worthwhile to note that one may take quite a differ-
ent approach to the issue of electoral behavior – analyzing individual behavior rather than that of 
communities of voters. Difficulties arise due to the balloting system where one cannot trace 
characteristics of the person responsible for a particular vote, so one has to heavily rely on the 
assumption of random selection. There exist such data collected by the National Election Study 
(NES), but nothing can guarantee random sampling as well as the absence of misreporting and 
non-responses. Besides, these data are pseudo-panels rather than true panels, since, as a rule, dif-
ferent people are inquired in different years. 
  In spite of availability of data and tools, the quantitative electoral literature mostly at-
tempts to draw conclusions from the observed partial correlations. One of the most serious 
treatments is Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (1981), which though does not go into the quantitative 
analysis beyond studying connections between the individual behavior and group data (Iversen 
1981). The present note tries to go farther in the quantitative analysis of electoral panels. It fol-
lows the aggregate approach, and takes into account not only time and cross-sectional dimen-
sions of the panels, but also the nesting effects caused by division of states into counties. The 
unit of analysis is a county, but counties are grouped in a natural way into larger divisions – 
states, and the behavior of two intra-state counties have more in common than that of two inter-
state ones. Although this does cause certain technical complications, the idea seems reasonable. 
2. The model 
2.1. The dependent variable and covariates 
  As mentioned in the introduction, the units of analysis are counties, which are grouped 
into states. As the dependent variable I take the percentage of votes of participated eligible elec-  2
torate for the Democratic Party representatives in congressional elections (held once every two 
years), which is conventional in the literature. I account for division of the rest of votes among 
other parties assuming that, in aggregate, independence of irrelevant alternatives holds. Towards 
this end, I assume that only Democrats and Republicans are the “relevant” alternatives, and so 
change the original return to the proportion of democratic votes in the “relevant” ones: 
% for D
Return (%).
% for D + % for R
=  
For simplicity, I ignore attrition, which, even if exists, must be negligible. The two parties do not 
distinguish themselves to a such extent that people behave strategically. This would have to be 
taken into account in analyzing electoral behavior in such country as Russia where the presence 
of the attrition bias is evident. 
  Not all county covariates matter for determination of election returns. While the race 
composition or average educational level of a county do matter, some socioeconomic indicators 
matter only on the state level. For example, one may argue that the distribution of income across 
counties is quite even for a given state, while the economic performance of the whole state af-
fects the electoral preferences, the per capita income of states indeed exhibiting strong variation. 
Thus I divide the regressors into two parts: the first, county-level covariates, and the second, 
state-level covariates. The composition of both parts will be discussed in section 4. 
2.2. State, county and time effects 
  The panel of data includes election return  ct y  for county c in year t, vector of county-
specific covariates  ct x  for county c in year t, and vector of state-specific covariates  st z  for state s 
in year t. The model, which is assumed to be linear, is written as  
ctctstsct yxzw abg ¢¢ =+++, 
where  sct w  is unobservable disturbance term, which is comprised of several components:  
sctstsct wu ml =++ ,  
where  s m  account for fixed state effects,  t l  denote fixed time effect, and  sct u  are stochastic dis-
turbances composed of the two random components:  , sctstct u ue =+ where  st u  are state-level 
stochastic disturbances, and  ct e  are remainder county-level stochastic disturbances. Both  st u  and 
ct e  are assumed to be independent of each other and of vectors of covariates  ct x  and  st z  for all t, 
s and c. In the panel-data language, the error has four components and nested groupings. Two of 
the unobservable effects are fixed and two others are random. The two fixed are state effects  s m  
and time effects  t l .  
  A state effect may be thought of as overall, net of accounting for z’s, conservatism or 
progressism of the state where the county belongs, which obviously affects election results. The 
rough analogy would be dividing the country into two large groups – North and South, which is 
often made in the growth literature. I allow subtler division of states permitting each state to 
have its own “index” of political preference, and expect the  s m  to exhibit clustering. Note that   3
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imposed. The time effects are quite comprehensible phenomena in electoral time-series data. 
They account for nationwide shifts in political preferences due to global events like outstanding 





= = ￿  or  0 S l =  should be imposed.  
The two random effects are state-time and county-time disturbances. The former repre-
sents all deviations of a state from nation-average behavior caused by, say, the behavior of state 
authorities. The latter is a remainder disturbance for the smallest unit of analysis. In an al-
ternative specification the state-time effects  st u  might be assumed fixed as well, but this would 
bring a loss of many degrees of freedom without clear advantage. 
  It is also worth noting that the above specification is not the most general as far as effects 
are concerned. Pure county effects free of time index are not present in the model. That is, I as-
sume that a county is just a subdivision of a larger unit – state, and does not have political pref-
erence bias not connected with the county’s covariates. All deviations are modeled by  ct e , and 
are assumed to be uncorrelated across time and counties. 
2.3. Nested effects and heteroskedasticity 
  The division of the units of analysis into larger groups in panel data has not been exten-
sively discussed in the literature, which usually assumes equal “cell” numbers (Ghosh 1976, 
Baltagi 1993). But in the problem under consideration this is certainly not the case: the number 
of counties within a state varies from one state to another. Although estimation methods become 
more complicated from technical perspective, they may nevertheless be generalized in a straight-
forward way.  
  Nothing yet has been said about the marginal distribution of  st u - and  ct e -disturbances. 
Since  st u  result from actions of state authorities, there is no reason to assume dependence of 
their marginal distribution on the size of a state. Where size does matter, it is in the e -compo-
nents that represent deviations from the average behavior of the county’s electorate. Therefore it 
is reasonable to link the variance of  ct e to the county population, or, which is more appropriate, 
the number of participated voters, i.e. eligible electorate multiplied by the turnout rate. Since the 
dependent variable is measured in percentages of votes, one may appeal to the Binomial distri-
bution. Let for one person the probability of voting for Democrats be p, then for n voters the 
variance of the election return is p(1-p)/n. This is in no way a precise argument (after all, p var-
ies across voters who do not behave independently, etc.) but rather a justification of the fol-
lowing form of heteroskedasticity: 
2 (). ctct Varn e es =  
2.4. The model in full 
  To recapitulate, the model is 
,  1,,,  1,,,  1,,, ctctstststct yxztTsScC abgmlue ¢¢ =++++++=== KKK    4
where  ( ) ( )
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~0,, ~0,, stctct iidinidn ue uses  and  st u  and  ct e  are independent of each other and 
of  ct x  and  st z ;  s m  are S fixed state effects,  0 S m = ;  t l  are T fixed time effects,  0 S l = ;  ct x  is a 
k1·1-vector of county-specific characteristics,  st z  is a k2·1-vector of state-specific characteris-
tics,  b  and g  are k1·1- and k2·1-vectors of parameters, a  is a common intercept,  ct n  is a par-
ticipation level in congressional elections in county c in year t, and  ct y  is the election return. In 
total there are k1 + k2 + S + T – 1 regression parameters and 2 variance parameters. In the matrix 
form the model looks as follows: 
 with E, E, E d ¢ =+==W= YRUU0UUUR0 , 
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ik is k·1 vector of ones, Ik is k·k identity matrix, Jk is k·k matrix of ones. 
3. Estimation technique 
  The asymptotic approximation is taken as  ,   SC ﬁ¥ﬁ¥ and T stays fixed. This al-
lows consistent estimation of the structural parameters  b  and g , as well as the time effects  t l . 
The state effects are not estimated consistently, but this inconsistency does not carry over to the 
structural parameters and time effects (Baltagi 2001). Of course, the number of states is fixed, 
but it is sizable (S = 47), and some of the states have just a few counties (e.g., Delaware). This 
makes estimates of the individual effects not quite reliable.  
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= =˜ PIdiagJ  and  . CT =- QIP  The matrices P and Q are symmetric, idem-
potent and mutually orthogonal. This allows one to easily determine the inverse of  W and its 
square root (see Baltagi 2001 for the details of this trick):  







































= Ndiagdiag    5
  For applying the feasible GLS procedure we have to consistently estimate 
2  u s  and 
2. e s  
This preliminary step does not affect the asymptotic distribution of the estimate of the vector d . 
We follow the approach of Balestra (1973). Note that the second term in the spectral decompo-
sition of W depends only on 
2
e s . This means that we can estimate 
2
e s  by getting rid of the first 
term with the aid of transformation 
21
. e s
- W= QNQ  Since  ( ) ~, W U0 ,  ( ) ~, ¢ W= QU0QQ  
( )
21 , e s
- 0NQ due to the symmetry of  W and idempotency of Q. It follows that an estimator of 










 where  ˆ U  is a vector of OLS residuals. Having obtained 
a consistent estimator for 
2
e s , one can proceed to estimation of 
2
u s . If one applies P to U, one 
gets 
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which allows one to estimate 
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- W  with imputed estimates for 
2
u s , 
2
e s  and computing estimates of  ct q  
for all c and t, one runs OLS on the transformed equations  
121212 ˆˆˆ
eee ssds
--- W=W+W YRU  
to get a consistent and asymptotically efficient estimate of  d  and of its variance matrix. One 
may iterate this procedure using previous step GLS residuals for estimating 
2
u s  and 
2
e s  until 
convergence. 
4. The data 
  The greatest difficulty of implementing the model is the need to have electoral, demo-
graphic and socioeconomic data. Since these different categories of data have been collected 
separately by different agencies, the task of combining them proves to be difficult. First, one has 
hard time finding periods when the congressial elections were held and for which demographic 
and socioeconomic records are available. Second, usually data sets contain different variables 
for different periods of time, and even if not, the units of measurement of a variable or its preci-
sion may vary over time, not to mention the fact that different studies give different values for 
the same variable. Also, the data sets are often highly blanked. 
  In this paper I use four data sources: Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (1986), Cohen and 
Gardner (1992), Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (1970) and Con-
don-Rall (1989). While the first and fourth sources do seem to be reliable, the other two are full 
of the abovementioned drawbacks. Therefore, I have had to balance between the desire to draw 
more information from the data sets and resistance to bring the problem to a one of lower di-
mension (e.g., shrinking it to just a cross-sectional one). Especially this concerns the choice of a 
set of regressors (see below).   6
  The data I use cover three periods of time: years 1930, 1940 and 1950 (so that T = 3). 
Not only are the electoral data quite complete for these periods, but also common basic demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteristics are available. The decade gap between the periods 
serves additionally as a source of larger variation in the covariates. The data set spans C = 2748 
counties in S = 47 states (Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii and Georgia are excluded be-
cause they do not have electoral data for some of the years). The set of county-specific regres-
sors consists of: the gender factor (share of male population), the race factor (share of non-white 
population), the average age adjusted by the average age of the nation, a square of the previous 
regressor, and the education factor (share of illiterate population above certain age). The only 
state-specific variable I use is per capita income in a state relative to that of the nation. Also, I 
have complete data on total numbers of voters for all counties. 
5. The results 
  For performing calculations GAUSS 3.1.19 for Windows was used. The feasible GLS 
procedure was iterated 24 times until the convergence up to 5 decimals was reached. The esti-
mates for the structural coefficients and time effects are gathered in Table I. All structural coef-
ficients look natural: the male factor acts strongly in favor of Republicans, the race factor acts in 
favor of Democrats, although not to such extent as one might imagine. The effect of the educa-
tion factor is that the illiterate people prefer Democrats, and very strongly. A better relative eco-
nomic performance of a state makes good to the Democratic Party if one is willing to set the sig-
nificance level larger than 9%. Strangely enough, the county average age is not statistically sig-
nificant when the control over the other covariates is taken. 
  Since the algorithm takes year 1950 as a “base” one, the signs and magnitudes of time 
effects tell us that 1930 was a year of a relative Democratic glory (just before the Great Depres-
sion) while 1940 was one of a relative Democratic fall (at the beginning of World War II). Fi-
nally, the state effects present an interesting pattern (see Table II). These pure state effects may 
be interpreted as intrinsic political preferences of states’ population. What a naked eye can catch 
is that the  s m , taken at face value from the above tables, reveal clustering exhibiting certain 
neighborhood gravitation. Figure 1 represents the pattern of the division of states by the state 
effects – indices of political influence of the parties (remember that Georgia fell out of the data 
set). 
  A look at the figure shows that although the evidence for neighborhood gravitation is 
strong, there are some exceptions. For example, Utah does not obey tastes of its neighbors. All 
exceptions have various (for instance, historical) reasons, which go beyond what the control of 
covariates. Utah was born as a Mormon religious state, and this is reflected in its intrinsic politi-
cal preference. In their turn, the clusters of states may have similar reasons to differ from other 
“political” regions. For example, that the southern states are Democratic may be explained by 
the fact that this party was the one of the South side during the Civil War era. 
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Figure 1. The pattern of clustering by influence of the parties net of covariates 
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Table I. The structural parameters and time effects 
Coefficient  Estimate  StError  t-stat  P-value 
b1 (male)  -.773  .110  -7.01  0% 
b2 (N/W)  .0785  .0138  5.68  0% 
b3 (age)  .0048  .0098  .49  62% 
b4 (age
2)  -.0001  .0002  -.65  52% 
b5 (unedu)  .364  .064  5.68  0% 
g1 (income)  .0362  .0213  1.70  9% 
l1 (1930)  .0296  .0157  1.88  6% 
l2 (1940)  -.0570  .0172  -3.31  0% 
 
 
Table II. The state effects 
State  Cs  Value  Iowa  99  -.146  Kentucky  38  .217 
Connecticut  8  -.026  Kansas  105  .096  Maryland  23  .241 
Maine  16  -.025  Minnesota  87  -.010  Oklahoma  77  .102 
Massachusetts  14  .067  Missouri  114  -.148  Tennessee  93  .293 
New Hampshire  10  -.120  Nebraska  93  -.051  West Virginia  55  .060 
Rhode Island  5  -.008  North Dakota  53  .309  Arizona  14  .050 
Vermont  14  -.046  South Dakota  67  .467  Colorado  63  .097 
Delaware  3  -.073  Virginia  97  .538  Idaho  44  .129 
New Jersey  21  -.038  Alabama  65  .435  Montana  56  .126 
New York  62  -.004  Arkansas  73  .467  Nevada  17  .077 
Pennsylvania  67  .049  Florida  67  .503  New Mexico  31  .034 
Illinois  102  -.104  Louisiana  64  .252  Utah  29  -.300 
Indiana  92  .013  Mississippi  82  .523  Wyoming  23  -.019 
Michigan  83  -.197  North Carolina  100  .487  California  58  -.038 
Ohio  88  -.031  South Carolina  44  .140  Oregon  36  .009 
Wisconsin  71  -.032  Texas  186  .083  Washington  39  .000 
 